Meta problem of consciousness pdf net Chalmers offers of problem reports include, ‘Consciousness is hard to explain’ (p. The problem of consciousness and introspection. Graziano and colleagues make clear progress towards a standard model of consciousness. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. See full list on consc. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. Reprint years. intuitions The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to 11 an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the 12 hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem. The author argues that a belief in consciousness does not undermine atheistic naturalism, despite the fact that consciousness cannot presently be explained by the physical sciences. Dec 25, 2019 · PDF | This essay is about how to think of the meta problem of consciousenss. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. Analytics. Therefore, the theory of the universe is a theory of consciousness. 9–10, 2019, pp. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. ?–? 1 David Papineau 2 Response to Chalmers’ 3 ‘The Meta-Problem 4 of Consciousness’ 5 Abstract: I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the 6 view that explaining the ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness is a neglected aspect of the illusion problem: the “illusion meta-problem”. We say that ‘she wasn’t I briefly and favourably assess the claim that there is no hard problem of consciousness; discussing the 'meta-problem of consciousness' and Keith Frankish's notion of a 'debunking argument'. The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. 12), and ‘Explaining behaviour does not explain consciousness’ (p. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down… David Chalmers在2018年发表了哲学论文《意识的元问题》（The meta-problem of consciousness），这被视为心智哲学上的重要工作。 我将首先概述此文内容。 许多人都承认意识的“困难问题”的存在，即，如何解释我们用感官感受外界输入时所拥有的主观体验？ In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. On this view, if we understand the nature of consciousness this will The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. What the Aug 1, 2013 · The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27 (5-6): 156–165, 2020. Sep 21, 2024 · Extending Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) into the Meta-Construct Problem, where qualia are seen as cognitive tools rather than metaphysical entities. consciousness” (6). Read full-text. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. Dec 12, 2024 · Download file PDF Read file. The problem Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Velmans and S. Neglecting the “meta-problem” can not only obscure the “hard François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. May 25, 2022 · The common reference for the “hard problem” of consciousness has become David Chalmers’s article “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995). We challenge the breadth of this “we” in this essay and a series of companion pieces that are underway. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. illusionism meta-problem of consciousness immediate justification. Two Caveats to the Meta-Problem headway with respect to solving the meta-problem. The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. It is well known that “consciousness” is used in a number of ways, most of which do not pose a relevant problem of consciousness. There is no doubt inferentialist view of the meta-problem, on which the hard problem results from inference, explains both the psychology and content introduction. If we had a solution to the hard problem, we would expect it to shed some light on the meta-problem. Most other theorists, by contrast, aim either too low a “ solution to the Meta-problem of consciousness will itself solve or dissolve the Hard Problem ” (C halmers, 2018, p. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. I also address the illusion meta-problem (Kammerer 2019a), which is to explain why illusionism seems especially counterintuitive. The illusion meta-problem A good way to explain the nature of the illusion meta-problem is to start with what many philosophers take to be the main flaw of illusionism: the fact that it is wildly implausible. perceptual illusions underlying the meta-problem of consciousness. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong Jan 23, 2017 · Consciousness, John Searle, Resistance to the Problem, Consciousness as a Biological Problem, Identifying the Target: The Definition of Consciousness, The Essential Feature of Consciousness: The Combination ofQualitativeness, Subjectivity and Unity, Some Other Features of Consciousness, The Traditional Mind-Body Problem and How to Avoid It, How Did We Get Into This Mess? Mar 8, 2022 · Pdf_module_version 0. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. the hard problem seems to be a different sort of problem, requiring a different sort of solution. It examines David Chalmers pro phenomenological formulation and Kieth | Find, read and cite all the research you core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. François Kammerer) Abstract: The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers' new paper introduces the meta-problem, lays out an interdisciplinary research program for addressing the meta-problem Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness is the problem of understanding the universe, reality and consciousness as part of the universe. More specifically, it is the problem of explaining not only why phenomenal consciousness seems to exist even though it does not (why The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. Jun 28, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) is the problem of explaining the behaviours and verbal reports that we associate with the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. Download full-text PDF. This problem is based on the notion that explaining brain functions cannot lead to explaining experience (Chalmers, 1995). We should therefore prefer an inferentialist view of the meta-problem. This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. More so than others, this kind of position very obviously demands addressing the meta-problem: “…the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 2018, p. Importantly, for an explanation Feb 15, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. J. A final section will be devoted to concluding remarks. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. The meta-problem is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 2018, 6). In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. ?–? 1 David Papineau 2 Response to Chalmers’ 3 ‘The Meta-Problem 4 of Consciousness’ 5 Abstract: I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the 6 view that explaining the ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness is Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Keith Frankish - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):83-94. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. org Republisher_time 333 Scandate 20220302235843 Scanner station65. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to … The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. ] There is a problem of constructing a theory of consciousness, and there is a problem of constructing a meta-theory which would serve as an epistemological (conceptual) basis for the theory of consciousness. So, these are Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. e. 0. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at getting Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining subjective experience. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. Jan 3, 2021 · In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. Here we question whether it actually does so, seeking to articulate the precise relation between neural activity and subjective experience. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Chalmers. For papers already in the archive at launch, only the most recent copy is listed here. One might initially feel comfortable dismissing this problem and following Carmel&Sprevak(2014),whostate: “We talk about consciousness in our everyday lives. > Neuroscience and the neural correlates of consciousness clinch, David Chalmers has proposed the “meta-problem of consciousness”, the prob-lem of why we think that there is a hard problem at all (Chalmers 2018: 6). There are two distinct claims involved in the idea that the hard problem and the meta-problem are closely connected. Copy link Link copied. 2 There he distinguished rather “easy” problems to scientifically explain cognitive functions (like the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental Jul 29, 2021 · In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers (J Conscious Stud 25(9–10):6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. The problem, he says, is a conceptual one Includes bibliographical references and index The Meta-Problem of Consciousness David J. Meta-Consciousness common use of the word Easy Problems of Consciousness explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. Jun 3, 2019 · Access-restricted-item true Addeddate 2019-06-03 03:00:47 Bookplateleaf 0008 Boxid IA1241011 Camera Jan 3, 2022 · Addresses the problem of consciousness in a material world. In order to counter meta-ignorance, Medina advances the development of “kaleidoscopic” consciousness involving multiple perspectives that The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. the explanans). cebu. To begin with, they aim at the right explanatory target. I believe that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. THE PROBLEM WITH THE HARD PROBLEM Does the Brain Produce the Mind? The original statement of the hard problem, as formulated by David Chalmers, is put like this: It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. The hard problem of consciousness and the meta-problem are closely connected. In reverse, if we had a solution to the meta-problem, we should expect it to shed some light on the hard problem. Jan 7, 2022 · PDF | On Jan 7, 2022, Michael Prost published The Meta-Problem of Philosophy and the Solution to the Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you cesses give rise to consciousness. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges This contribution examines two radically different explanations of our phenomenal intuitions, one reductive and one strongly non-reductive, and identifies two germane ideas that could benefit many other theories of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. The Measurement Problem of Consciousness. 6). In a fourth section, I will argue that Graziano’s account cannot solve the illusion meta-problem, and in a fifth section I will argue the same about Pereboom’s view. First-person interventions and the meta-problem of consciousness Colin Klein (The Australian National University) Andrew B. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. Barron (Macquarie University) Abstract Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. The Simulation Hypothesis and Meta-Problem of Everything Marcus Arvan University of Tampa marvan@ut. The meta problem of consciousness is the problem that why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. ” Against this, I experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. We argue that emotions and the sense of self function as adaptive mechanisms Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. The easy The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. Synthese, 199: 5455-5477, 2021. Equivalently, it is the problem of explaining why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. archive. The second consists in >The meta-problem of consciousness… The meta-problem of >consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems,… [S. of oppression. Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem. The Meta-Problem, Introspection, and Inference The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain the origin of the hard problem This paper was funded by Australian Research Council Grant FT140100422 (to CK) and FT140100452 (to ABB). I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. Illusionism provides one way in which the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. However, illusionism is highly counterintu- According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. Jan 31, 2019 · Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. Whether consciousness is hard to explain depends on the notion of explanation at play. 11), ‘I can’t see how consciousness could be physical’ (p. INTRODUCTION Machine learning has advanced explosively in the last three decades and has enabled numerous practical consciousness (2012), and for a Type Q(uinian) approach to consciousness and the hard problem more generally (2017). 9 discussion of the meta-problem. Rodrigo Díaz - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):55-75. Firstly, the ability consciousness, in relation to memory consolidation and reconsolidation. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). Q: How is the hard problem of consciousness different from the easy problems? Apr 27, 2018 · Featuring comprehensive coverage of all core topics in the field, this edition includes: > Why the problem of consciousness is so hard. The problem at issue is Consciousness meta = about itself. The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness. The first is that a solution to the hard problem should shed light on the meta-problem. 2 days ago · A: The meta-problem of consciousness is a problem closely tied to the hard problem of consciousness, focusing on behavior and the challenges of understanding subjective experiences. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. In particular, to answer how the brain produces consciousness. P. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. ?–? 1 David Papineau 2 Response to Chalmers’ 3 ‘The Meta-Problem 4 of Consciousness’ 5 Abstract: I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the 6 view that explaining the ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness is In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. May 21, 2019 · The meta-problem is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 2018, 6). In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i. unexplainable should remain as strong as ever, which could account for the meta-problem. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Phenomenology and the Unity of Consciousness . Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. 7). The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the "hard problem of consciousness" in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles The meta-problem is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 2018, 6). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. David J. 8). Mar 3, 2020 · Graziano and colleagues make clear progress towards a standard model of consciousness, and aim at the right explanatory target, which most other theorists aim either too low or too high. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem (link) (pdf). The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. A solution to the meta-problem could shed experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. Jun 24, 2020 · Chalmers (2018) has recently dubbed this the ‘meta-problem of consciousness'. Aug 1, 2023 · Abstract Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. theory (Leinster, 2014) there is, unfortunately, no term for consciousness that is part of our folk terminology. Letuscallthisproblemtheproblem of a missing folk term. 2 Medina introduces the term “meta-ignorance” (ER, 149) to name a tenacious form of active ignorance that operates at a meta-level and involves an ig-norance of one’s ignorance. Apr 3, 2024 · The conclusion that consciousness intuitions are constructed psychologically further underscores the intimate link between the “hard problem” and the problem of explicating the psychological mechanisms that give rise to intuitions (the “meta-problem” (Chalmers 2018)). However, this argument may generate an immediate questioning Reprinted (as “The Hard Problem of Consciousness” and “Naturalistic Dualism”) in (M. Schneider, eds) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007). taken from a parallel between the meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018, 2020) and category. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers Jun 3, 2023 · Chapter 5: Phenomenal consciousness and meta-consciousness Chapter 6: Meta-consciousness in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics Chapter 7: The will’s strife for meta-consciousness May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Chalmers examines eleven possible solutions to the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. The universe is what we know about the universe. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal This paper challenges long-held beliefs about consciousness and selfhood, proposing that these phenomena—far from being intrinsic or metaphysical—are evolved survival tools. David Chalmers suggests problems of consciousness into “hard” and “easy” problems. 1. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness. a neglected aspect of the illusion problem: the “illusion meta-problem”. A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. Mar 21, 2021 · Unseen seer and the field -- Pure consciousness and Indian Buddhism -- Eckhart, Gezücken, and the ground of the soul -- Ayin : the concept of nothingness in Jewish mysticism -- Contemporary epistemology and the study of mysticism -- Mysticism and its contexts -- Are pure consciousness events unmediated? (See Page 8, The Meta Problem of Consciousness, for more): The meta problem of consciousness (Chalmers 2018): “the problem of explaining phenomenal reports (reports which indicate that there is a hard problem of consciousness) in topic-neutral terms: roughly, terms that do not mention consciousness (or cognate notions such as qualia The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. Two Caveats to the Meta Request PDF | The meta-problem and the transfer of knowledge between theories of consciousness: a software engineer's take | This contribution examines two radically different explanations of our By default, all copies archived after the launch of PhilArchive (October 2017) are listed here. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. By “empirically adequate”, we mean a theory that would allow us, forinstance,to: determine which brain regions are important for consciousness, whether attention is necessary for consciousness, how consciousness disappears during dreamless sleep, Abstract Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. The meta-problem is roughly the problem of explaining why we think phenomenal consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. We challenge the breadth of this claim. edu Abstract: In a new paper, David. Chalmers The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. Added to PP 2020-05-21 Downloads 650 (#32,698) 6 months 95 (#59,500) The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness 1. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, … The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Mar 14, 2022 · Friston is an eliminativist trying to provide a topic neutral explanation to the hard problem of consciousness and not to the meta-problem like Clark; however, what is interesting here from a modeling point is that Lisman (2005) and Lisman and Buzsáki (2008) “theta precession inspired” Temporal Coding mechanism seems to provide such In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. ’ illusion problem. Importantly, for an explanation to be successful, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the relevant basic empirical facts (i. Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. I will later argue that currently available illusionist theories of consciousness cannot solve it. 18 Ppi 360 Rcs_key 24143 Republisher_date 20220308140951 Republisher_operator associate-jhoankhatelampadio-antonio@archive. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. ” Jan 2, 2018 · Abstract Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. meta-problem of consciousness, “The Meta-Problem Challenge” . reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. physical. org Mar 1, 2022 · Download full-text PDF Read full-text. Download citation. 1 Introduction Illusionism avoids the hard problem of consciousness by positing that phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning Jan 1, 2019 · Request PDF | On Jan 1, 2019, Hakwan Lau and others published A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate Feb 12, 2019 · Request PDF | A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness | Whether consciousness is hard to explain depends on the notion of explanation at play. 13 The Problem of Higher-Order Misrepresentation . A satisfying solution to the hard problem ought to explain why it seemed like there was a hard problem in the first place—why first-order invariants seem arbitrary and inexplicable, even if they are not. Many otherwise promising accounts clearly fail to fit the bill. A solution to the meta-problem could shed Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. 3. Philosophical Psychology, 35 (6): 842-861, 2022. But the question of how it is that these The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. 5 While the illusion problem is the general problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises, the illusion meta-problem concerns the explanation of its peculiar strength. Our proposal naturally unifies the feature binding, recurrent processing, predictive processing, and global workspace theories of consciousness. We challenge the breadth of this “we," arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. uwqpas tkff mpxrtn qmih othahlu wrcvl fjhn oquwqr siqmm pfmixs